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THE JUDGE'S RELATIVE IS AFFILIATED
WITH COUNSEL OF RECORD:
THE ETHICAL DILEMMA
Leslie W Abramson*
Ten years ago the United States Supreme Court deemed it
appropriate to issue a special recusal policy. It addressed potential
ethical issues raised by seven of the nine justices having spouses,
children or other relatives practicing in law firms that regularly appeared
before the Court. Although the Supreme Court's unique position led to a
somewhat unique removal policy, there is nothing unique about a
judge's spouse or child practicing law.
Due to concerns about direct influence or favoritism flowing from
the bench to a related attorney, a judge has long been prohibited from
presiding over a case when a close lawyer-relative is acting as counsel.
However, judicial ethics standards also address the more attenuated
connection where the judge is assigned to hear a case in which the
lawyer-relative is not counsel of record but is in fact affiliated with that
counsel. If that connection results in an appearance of partiality or a
suspicion that the lawyer-relative is benefiting from a case in the judge's
court, generally it is the judge rather than the relative who should
withdraw from the case.
This Article examines various aspects of the judge's ethical
dilemma. Part I discusses the relevant federal and state ethical standards.
Part II addresses the application of the standards in case law and other
situations. Part III proposes supplemental Code or Commentary
language for consideration by state and federal courts and legislatures.
I.

APPLICABLE ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR JUDGES

Ethical concerns about a judge's relatives appearing as counsel
before him have a long history in American jurisprudence.' In 1924, the
*
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House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted thirty-four
Canons of Judicial Ethics, 2 which a majority of the states subsequently3
adopted in some form and applied for most of the next half century.
Canon 13 addressed the issue of a relative's influence on the judge:
A judge should not act in a controversy where a near relative is a party;
he should not suffer his conduct to justify the impression that any
person can improperly influence him or unduly enjoy his favor, or that
he is affected by the kinship, rank, position or influence of any party or
other person.4

In 1972, an ABA Special Committee on Standards of Judicial
Conduct, chaired by California Chief Justice Roger Traynor, completed
three years of work and persuaded the ABA House of Delegates to adopt
higher and more explicit standards ofjudicial conduct. 5 Federal statutory
provisions 6 adopted in 1974 are similar to the 1972 Code of Judicial
1. The first disqualification statute in the United States was the Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36,
§ 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278-79, which was amended by the Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643. The
statute was further amended by the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090, which
provided in pertinent part:
Whenever it appears that the judge of any district court is in any way concerned in
interest in any suit pending therein,... or is so related to or connected with either party
as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, it shall be his duty, on
application by either party, to cause the fact to be entered on the records of the court ....
The 1911 statute was amended by the Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 869, 908.
Between 1948 and 1974, the federal statute provided no guidance on the question of how to
determine the substantiality of the judge's interest in a party. The statute provided:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he
has a substantial interest ... or is so related to or connected with any party or his
attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or
other proceeding therein.
Id.
2. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 581 (2004).

3.

See id.

4.

CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 13 (1924).

5.

See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface (1972) (noting that work began on the Code in

1969); E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 1 (1973) (noting

Judge Traynor was committee chairman).
6. The Judicial Conference of the United States adopted the Code with modifications
approved April 6, 1973 and March 6, 1975. On December 5, 1974, the Judicial Disqualification Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 was enacted and codified as 28 U.S.C. § 455. In pertinent part, 28
U.S.C. § 455 (2000) currently provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: ...
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of
them, or the spouse of such a person:
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Conduct. The Code's general Canon 3 language states that "a judge7
should perform the duties of his office impartially and diligently.
Almost two decades later, in 1990 the ABA House of Delegates adopted
a revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct.8 In addition to the
disqualification provisions of Canon 3,9 Canon 2 of the Code
specifically prohibits a judge from allowing his or her family
relationships to influence his or her judicial conduct or judgment, or
conveying or permitting others to convey the impression that they are in
a special position to influence the judge.' 0
A.

Appearance of Partiality

Both modem versions of the ABA's Model Code of Judicial
Conduct impose a duty upon a judge to "disqualify himself or herself in
a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including but not limited to"" a non-exclusive list of
specific situations where the likelihood of prejudice or its appearance is
presumed. 12
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
In addition to the federal statute, federal judges adopted a Code of Conduct through the Judicial
Conference of the United States in 1992. Its disqualification language mirrors the 1972 Code. See
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, 150 F.R.D. 307, 311-12 (1992).
7. CODE OF JUDICtAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1972).
8.

Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990), with CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

(1972) (replacing the word "should" in Canons 1, 2, 3, and 5, and the word "may," in Canon 4, with
the word "shall").
9. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (1990).
10. See id. Canon 2B; see also Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 949, 967-75 (1996).
11. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l) (1990).
12. The 1972 Code states that in such situations a judge "should disqualify," while the 1990
Code mandates that the judge "shall disqualify." Although most courts have construed the 1972
Code's "should disqualify" to signify a mandatory duty, disqualification under Canon 3 in the 1990
Code clearly became mandatory. Compare CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C (1972), with
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (1990). As the Preamble to the 1990 Code attempts
to explain:
When the text uses "shall" or "shall not," it is intended to impose binding obligations the
violation of which can result in disciplinary action. When "should" or "should not" is
used, the text is intended as hortatory and as a statement of what is or is not appropriate
conduct but not as a binding rule under which a judge may be disciplined.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble (1990).
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One of the specific examples in both the 1972 and 1990 Code
requires recusal where the "judge or the judge's spouse, or a person
within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of
such a person: . . . (ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding."13 Both
versions of the Code thus require judicial recusal when a close relative
appears as counsel or works on the case. No exceptions exist; when the
judge's relative is counsel of record, the judge is disqualified.
When the judge's relative does not appear as counsel of record in
the proceeding but is a lawyer in the same firm as counsel of record, the
specific standard is inapplicable. The judge's relative is not acting as a
lawyer in the proceeding but is merely affiliated with the firm. Is the
judge then able to preside over the proceeding without any ethical
concern? The Codes contain two sources of guidance.
First, the Commentary1 4 of each Code, like the aforementioned
standards, is nearly identical. The 1990 Commentary states in part [with
bracketed deletions for the 1972 version of the Commentary]:
The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with
which a [lawyer-] relative of the judge is affiliated does not of itself
disqualify the judge. Under appropriate circumstances, the fact that
"[his] the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned" under
Section

[3C(1)]

disqualification. I

3E(I) ... may

require

[his]

the

judge's

The Commentary leaves open the possibility that mere affiliation
by a judge's relative with counsel of record may be sufficient for
disqualification. The textual basis for disqualification is the general
Of the forty-nine states that have adopted some form of the ABA Code, all use the term "shall" to
describe the judge's responsibility to disqualify, except for Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Washington, which use the term "should."
13. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(d)(ii) (1990); CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT 3C(l)(d)(ii) (1972). The "[t]hird degree of relationship" is defined as a "greatgrandparent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, great-grandchild,
nephew or niece." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (1990). Under the 1972 Code,
the "degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system." CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3C(a) (1972).
14. In both ABA Codes, a commentary follows the "black-letter" standards. The commentary
is intended to provide guidance to interpretation of the Canons, rather than a statement of additional
rules. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble (1990); CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Preface (1972).
15.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(l)(d)(ii) cmt. (1990);

CODE OF

JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1)(d)(ii) cmt. (1972). This provision has been adopted substantially
or verbatim by about thirty states. Nine states, on the other hand, have adopted none of the
commentary: Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Vermont.
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standard requiring recusal when the judge's "impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. 1 6 Because the language following the general
rule mandates recusal "including but not limited to" the specific
examples, courts interpret and apply
the appearance of partiality beyond
7
illustrations.'
explicit
the rule's
Although the specific standards cover most of the situations in which
the disqualification issue will arise, the general standard should not be
overlooked. Any conduct that would lead a reasonable [person]
knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge's
"impartiality mifht reasonably be questioned" is a basis for the judge's
disqualification. 8
The appearance of partiality thus functions as an inclusive "catchall" provision available as the source for evaluating recusal in two
situations: (1)when facts do not altogether match the language of the
specific examples; or (2) when the situation obviously falls outside the
specific scenarios. 19 In either case, the general rule operates as a "fall16. Thus, there is a relationship between the general standard of the appearance of partiality
and the specific per se examples of disqualifying conditions where unfairness and bias are assumed.
Disqualification is not confined to the enumerated "laundry list" examples that follow the general
rule.
The use of the term "reasonably" suggests that the viewpoint for assessing the presence
of an appearance of impropriety is not from the perspective of the judge whose
continued control of the case is at issue. In part to promote public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary, states use a reasonable person standard to decide the existence
of an appearance of impropriety. What purpose does the term "reasonably" serve? Does
it operate to affect the care a judge exercises before deciding whether to preside in a
case? In other words, if "might" suggests a cautious approach to remaining in a case
when there is a concern about appearances, "reasonably" suggests that such caution
should be used only if a reasonable person would conclude an appearance of impropriety
was present. Thus, a judge who subjectively believes that there is no appearance problem
nevertheless may be persuaded to recuse if the reasonable person would find an
appearance. Conversely, an overly cautious judge who leans toward recusal whenever
anyone raises an appearance problem may decide to remain in a case if a reasonable
person could discover no appearance of impropriety.
Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might
Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 58-59 (2000).
17. See, e.g., Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384 (Del. 1991) ("[T]he designated instances
prompting disqualification do not exhaust all situations in which a judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned."); State ex rel. Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990) ("[A] judge's duty to disqualify is not confined to the factors listed.., but is much
broader.").
18. THODE, supranote 5, at 60 (1973).
19. See King v. State, 271 S.E.2d 630, 633 (Ga. 1980). In King, the court found that a district
attorney-now-judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in violation of Canon 3C( l)(b). However,
because the court found no actual bias, it held that the appearance of partiality sufficed for the
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back" position for any judge or party considering judicial
disqualification.
When the Commentary describes the issue of judicial
disqualification for judges whose "lawyer-relative" is in the same law
firm as counsel of record, the scope of such relationships are presumably
the same as the Code's explicit standard-a family relationship between
a judge and the judge's spouse, the third degree of relationship to either
the judge or the judge's spouse, or the spouse of such third-degree
relative. Because the Commentary indicates that disqualification is not
automatic, the nature of the relationship as well as the face of the
relationship may be relevant. For example, spousal relationships are
regarded by the average person "as the closest of all human
relationships," so that a judge and his or her spouse would be unable to
maintain a wall between their personal lives and their professional
2
responsibilities. 21 In Smith v. Beckman,22
the court presumed that a
marriage relationship between a judge and a prosecutor-spouse required
the judge's recusal, without any other facts necessary to call into
question the judge's impartiality:
[A]n appearance of impropriety is created by the close nature of the
marriage relationship. A husband and wife generally conduct their
personal and financial affairs as a partnership. In addition to living
together, a husband and wife are also perceived to share confidences
regarding their personal lives and employment situations. Generally,
the public views married people as "a couple," as "a partnership," and
as participants in a relationship more
intimate than any other kind of
23
relationship between individuals.
Thus, the risk of favoritism and the chance that confidential
information might be transferred may appear greater when the law firm
judge's disqualification. See id. at 634. But see Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 552-53 (1994)

(appearance of partiality standard is no broader than the specific sections that follow it in the federal
judicial disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455).
20.

See Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 390 (N.H. 1992). In Blaisdell, while

analyzing the appearance of partiality when a judge's uncle's firm appeared before the judge, the
court responded to the contention that the judge's relative would not be substantially affected by the
case's outcome because there was no actual relationship between the two by saying "[w]hether there
was an ongoing personal relationship between the judge and his uncle is irrelevant" to the effect of
the proceeding on the relative. Id. at 389-90.
21.

See In re Billedeaux, 972 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1992). Siblings also are assumed to

"enjoy a close personal and family relationship and, consequently, would be inclined to support
each other's interests." SCA Servs. Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 116 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
22.

683 P.2d 1214 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).

23.

Id. at 1216.
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of which a judge's spouse is a partner represents a party before the
judge.
B. Relative-Lawyer's Interest
The second textual source for disqualification when the judge's
relative is affiliated with counsel of record is Canon 3E(1)(d)(iii). It
requires recusal when the same family relationship mentioned in Canon
3E(1)(d)(ii)14 exists and the relative "is known by the judge to have a
more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the
proceeding. 25 The judge must make a reasoned assessment of the
relative's interest and whether that interest could be substantially
affected by the case. The 1972 Code uses similar language in Canon
3C(1)(d)(iii). However, the 1972 standard and the federal statute refer
(1) to any "interest" rather than "more than a de minimis interest" by the
relative, and (2) to the effect that the "outcome of the proceeding" could
have on the relative's interest. 26 In addition to this black-letter approach,
the Commentary also addresses the situation [with a bracketed exception
for the 1972 version of the Commentary]:
Under appropriate circumstances, the fact that ...the [lawyer-]relative
is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be
"substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding" under
27
Section 3[C]E(1)(d)(iii) may require the judge's disqualification.
24. See supra text accompanying note 13.
25.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(d)(iii) (1990). For all the benefits

realized by the addition of a Terminology section to the 1990 Code, there was still no definition of
"interest." While it may appear useful that a "de minimis" interest is defined in the 1990 Code as
"an insignificant interest that could not raise reasonable question as to the judge's impartiality," its
vagueness makes it difficult to apply. Id. Conduct Terminology.
26. See id.Canon 3C(l)(d)(iii). The phrase "the outcome of' was deleted from the 1990
Code, because "the very existence and interim results of a proceeding, in addition to the
proceeding's outcome, could be relevant to the interests of a person in a proceeding." LISA L.
MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 28 (1992). Thus, the lawyer-relative's

interest that could be substantially affected can depend either on the proceeding itself or its
outcome. The change arguably accommodates a larger role for the lawyer-relative's reputational or
goodwill interest.
27. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(l)(d) cmt. (1990); CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1)(d)(iii) cmt. (1972). It is curious that the Commentary carries forward the
language about the "outcome of'the proceeding even though the 1990 black-letter text deletes that
phrase.
Some discussions about due process focus on whether the judge has some interest in the
outcome of a case. In Fero v. Kerby, the court ruled that the fact that the judge's brother-in-law had
a substantial interest in the outcome of a criminal case that would enhance the value of the brotherin-law's parallel civil suit "did not give rise to a direct, pecuniary interest on the judge's part" in the

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 7

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1181

Regardless of whether the analysis is based on the appearance of
partiality or the "interest" approach, the size of the firm and the potential
fee from the case are important but often overlooked parts of the analysis
about whether disqualification is necessary "under appropriate
circumstances:"
For example, if the judge's relative is a member of a two-person law
firm in a case in which the firm stands to earn a $1,000,000
contingency fee, then disqualification is clearly required. On the other
hand, if the judge's relative is a new associate in a ninety-person law
firm in a case in which the firm stands
to earn a fee of $1,000,
28
disqualification clearly is not required.
The nature of the "interest" that may be affected by the lawyerrelative's representation is usually monetary. Some cases also discuss
whether the judge's role in the case would advance the relative's nonpecuniary interest such as the reputation of the relative or the firm, or the
interest in goodwill which attracts clients. 29 The interests in reputation
and goodwill also may create an appearance of impropriety.3 °
C. Disclosure of the Relationship by the Judge and Waiver
Disclosure of the judge's relationship to a lawyer affiliated with an
attorney of record may occur in two contexts. In both situations, the
openness associated with disclosure advances the integrity of the
judiciary and the public's trust in the judge. First, the 1990 Commentary
states that a judge "should" disclose on the record any information that
the parties "might" consider relevant to disqualification issues. 31 Courts
increasingly view the duty to disclose such information as broader than
the duty to disqualify. 32 Even though the judge is not required to
civil case. 39 F.3d 1462, 1479 (10th Cir. 1994). The ethical standard says nothing about whether the
judge has an interest; the focus is on the lawyer-relative. But due process analysis includes an
evaluation of whether the judge had an interest in the case being adjudicated. See Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986).
28. Adams v. Deaton, Inc., 644 So. 2d 189, 190-91 (La. 1994) (Lemmon, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari).
29. See, e.g., Pashaian v. Eccelston Props., Ltd., 88 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1996); State v.
Logan, 689 P.2d 778, 784-85 (Kan. 1984); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1114
(5th Cir. 1980); SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 115 (7th Cir. 1977).
30. See Reg'l Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 258 (Utah 1992).
31. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E cmt. (1990). The 1972 Code and the
federal statute are silent on the disclosure issue.
32. See, e.g., In re Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701, 711 (Ind. 1998) (holding that the commentary to
Canon 3E "reveals a separate obligation to disclose that is broader than the duty to disqualify").
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disclose, revealing that a judge's relative is affiliated with a law firm of
record in the case can promote public confidence in the bench, because it
eliminates the likelihood that a party, or a lawyer, will later learn about
the affiliation and conclude that the judge improperly failed to disqualify
sua sponte. Even if the parties and lawyers disagree with the judge's
decision that recusal is unnecessary, revealing the information at least
avoids any hint that the judge concealed important information from
them. In addition, disclosure permits them to preserve the recusal issue
for appellate review.
Second, disclosure may also occur when the judge is seeking
waiver or "remittal" of a disqualifying conflict from all the parties and
attorneys. For a valid waiver, the judge typically must disclose the basis
for disqualification and all parties and counsel must waive the
disqualification in writing or on the record without any judicial
influence.33 Unlike the aforementioned reason for disclosure of relevant
information to enable the parties and attorneys to decide whether to seek
the judge's disqualification, disclosure here presupposes that the judge
believes that recusal is appropriate; i.e., without the waiver by the parties
and attorneys the judge is disqualified from the case. The 1990 Code
permits waiver where the basis for disqualification is either the
appearance of partiality or the substantial effect of the case on the
relative's interest. 34 By contrast, under the 1972 Code, remittal is
permitted only for the relative's interest, but not for the appearance of
partiality.3 5 Conversely, under the federal statute, a waiver of judicial
recusal may be obtained for an appearance of partiality but not for an
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the case.36

33. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3F cmt. (1990).
34. See id. Canon 3F. The 1990 standard, allowing waiver for the appearance of partiality,
applies in more than two dozen states. See Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety, supra note 16, at
63 n.42.
35. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D (1972). Approximately a dozen states still
follow this waiver standard. See Abramson, Appearance ofImpropriety, supra note 16, at 63 n.4 1.

36. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (2000) provides:
(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties to the proceeding

a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the
ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted
provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.
For an example of a case discussing the issues surrounding waiver of recusal, see CloverdaleEquip.
Co. v. Manitowoc Eng'g Co., 964 F. Supp. 1152, 1155-56 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (judge's child was an
associate in the law firm representing one of the parties; both parties consented and agreed to
judge's continued participation).
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THE LAWYER-RELATIVE'S LAW FIRM POSITION

A.

Lawyer-Relative as Partner

Courts are most willing to disqualify a judge when his or her
relative is a partner in the law firm of record.37 Judicial analysis of the
recusal issue for judges whose lawyer-relatives are partners in law firms
often begins with discussion of established agency and partnership
principles.38 An agency relationship exists between law firm partners
and between each partner and the law firm. 39 As a result of the rights,

duties and liabilities of the partnership relationship, a partner has an
interest in every matter handled by the firm. 40 The result of any firm
representation can affect each partner's financial interest as well as his
or her non-economic interest such as reputation or good will. 41 Thus, the
law firm's appearance or an entry of appearance by an individual partner
of that firm is the equivalent of an entry by each lawyer in the firm.
Several cases apply a per se rule of judicial disqualification when
the judge's lawyer-relative is a partner in the same law firm as counsel
of record; as with Potashnick v. Port City Construction Company, all
have applied the specific "interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome" standard.42 Equity partners typically receive a fixed
percentage of the law firm's income that is not dependent on the
outcome of any particular case, and that partnership share always has the

37. See Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
"that when a partner in a law firm is related to a judge within the third degree, that partner will
always be 'known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome' of a proceeding involving the partner's law firm" and thus the judge is required to
disqualify him or herself (emphasis added)).
38. See, e.g., SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 114 (7th Cir. 1977).
39. See In re Moffett, 556 So. 2d 723, 725-26 (Miss. 1990) (where the judge's brother's firm
represented one of the parties, the court noted that the public, knowing nothing about the parties,
lawyers or the judge would nevertheless probably react to a legal victory by the judge's brother's
firm by saying, "'Why, no wonder, the judge's brother was one of the lawyers.' The appearance of
impropriety!").
40. See, e.g., Unif. Partnership Act, §§ 6, 9, 11-15 (1914).
41. See Potashnick,609 F.2d at 1113; SCA Serv., Inc., 557 F.2d at 114.
42. See Potashnick, 609 F.2d at 1113 (partner); Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388,
390 (N.H. 1992) (partner); Reg'l Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 258 (Utah 1992)
(partner or equity participant); SCA Serv., Inc., 557 F.2d at 112n.2, 116 (partner). These cases were
decided either under the federal statute which does not include the permissive language of the
Commentary, or by courts in states which have not adopted the Commentary.
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potential to be affected by the outcome of each of the firm's cases. 43 A
rule of automatic disqualification may be harsh and inconvenient, but the
opinions regard the public's confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary and the specific judge as more important.4
In contrast to the per se cases, a fact-bound application of the
ethical standard may result in a conclusion that disqualification is
unnecessary. The Code and federal statutory standards prescribe recusal
when a close relative "is known by the judge to have an interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. ' '
Pashaian v. Eccelston Properties, Ltd.4 6 criticized the per se recusal
cases by stating that it is "unrealistic to assume... that partners in
today's law firms invariably 'have an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of any case in which any other partner is
involved. '' 4 7 After considering in camera the extent of financial
participation of the judge's wife's sister's husband in the net income of
the law firm of record and the amount in controversy in the instant case,
the judge concluded that the lawyer-relative's interest in the law firm
would not be "substantially affected" by the outcome of the case. 48
Pashaian's approach is more realistic than Potashnick's for
measuring whether a lawyer-relative has an interest which could be

43. See Potashnick,609 F.2d at 1113-14; Reg'7 Sales Agency, Inc., 830 P.2d at 256. Regional
Sales recognized that the connection between judicial decisions and the relative's compensation is
greatest when the fee arrangement is contingent on the outcome of the case or requires the judge to
award attorney fees. See id. Regional Sales was distinguished in Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 81
P.3d 758 (Utah 2003), because the latter was a "judicial discipline matter[] where no money is at
issue .. " 81 P.3d at 760; see also SCA Servs., Inc., 557 F.2d at 115 ("[A] favorable outcome
would obviously justify a higher fee.").
44. See Potashnick, 609 F.2d at 1112. It is doubtful whether the "interest" analysis, as a
financial "interest," compels recusal when the lawyer-relative does not join the firm until after the
representation. For example, weeks before the 2000 election, John Scalia, Justice Scalia's son,
accepted a position with the firm later representing George W. Bush in the Florida courts although
he did not join the firm as a shareholder until January 2001. See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts
ofInterest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375, 425
(2003). Reputational interests, on the other hand, inure to the partners at the time of the
representation as well as to partners who later join the firm.
45. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C( I)(d)(iii) (1972).
46. 88 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1996).
47. Pashaian v. Eccelston Props., Ltd., 88 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(5)(iii)) (emphasis in original).
48. See id. at 78. A lawyer-relative who is a partner also may lack an interest "that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding" when the partner is a salaried partner rather
than an equity partner. See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1241,
1266-67 (N.D. II1. 1996).
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substantially affected by the outcome of a case.49 Increasingly, law firms
have different levels of partnership based in large part on investment and
compensation. Traditionally, all law firm partners shared in the profits
(or losses) of the firm, but many large firms now have both equity
partners and salaried partners. Because salaried partners have a set
income with no investment in the partnership, it is more difficult to
identify how they possess an interest that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of a particular case. Thus, whether a lawyer-relative has
an "interest" in the outcome of a proceeding, requiring judicial
disqualification, may depend in large part on the type of partnership held
by the relative. 50
Even if disqualification is denied because the judge's relative lacks
an "interest" in the outcome of the case, disqualification is also possible
when lawyer-relatives are partners, under the general "appearance of
impropriety" criterion and pursuant to the Codes' Commentary. In
Jenkins v. ForrestCounty General Hospital,5 1 the judge's brother was a
senior partner in the law firm representing a hospital, and the medical
community had assisted in electing the judge. Finding no wrongdoing
by the judge, the appellate court nevertheless found that its "potential"
for wrongdoing and how the situation appears to the public and the
parties would raise doubts in reasonable persons' minds about the
judge's impartiality.53
The appearance of partiality also may be a concern when the
judge's relative is a partner in a firm that does not represent a party in
the current case, but instead represents it in other litigation and therefore
receives fees from that client. In Microsoft Corporation v. United
States,54 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that he had not recused himself
from consideration of Microsoft's petition for certiorari in an antitrust
suit brought by the United States, even though his son is a partner in the
49. The Pashianan approach appears to disregard a law firm's non-pecuniary interests in
reputation or goodwill with its clients and in the ability to attract new clients as part of the "interest"
analysis. Potashnick, on the other hand, addresses the issue as part of the "interest" analysis. See
Potashnick,609 F.2d at 1113.
50. Withdrawal from representation of a party cures the disqualifying interest for the judge.
See, e.g., S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F.2d 1241, 1248 (7th Cir. 1978).
51. 542 So. 2d 1180 (Miss. 1989). The following year, the same court cited Jenkins in support
of the same judge's disqualification when his brother's firm was counsel of record. See In re
Moffett, 556 So. 2d 723, 724 (Miss. 1990). However, four dissenters noted that reliance upon
Jenkins was misplaced. See id. at 728 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
52. See ForrestCounty Gen. Hosp., 542 So. 2d at 1180.
53. Seeid. at ll81.
54. 530 U.S. 1301 (2000).
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party's law firm retained as local counsel by Microsoft in private
antitrust litigation.55 He conceded that the Court's decision could affect
Microsoft's exposure in other antitrust lawsuits, but he reasoned that
[e]ven our most unremarkable decision interpreting an obscure federal
regulation might have a sigiificant impact 'on the clients of our
children who practice law. Giving such a broad sweep to [the
appearance of impropriety rule] seems
contrary to the "reasonable
56
embraces.
it
which
standard
person"

Certainly, every case decided by an appellate judge may affect a
client represented by a law firm that includes a judge's relative.
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist's broad statement ignores the fact that
he had decided a case involving not just any party, but the same party his
son's firm was representing in pending litigation about the same types of
issues.57 An objective observer might conclude that his participation in
the certiorari application would give rise to an appearance of partiality,
and that observer at least would be interested in knowing more
information about the connection between the Supreme Court appeal and
the other litigation before a definitive conclusion could be reached.
In 1993, seven Justices of the United States Supreme Court issued a
"Statement of Recusal Policy" about lawyer-relatives of Justices who are

55. See id.
at 1301.
56. Id. at 1303.
57. An interest that a judge might have in the lawyer-relative's success "is not the type of
interest which would lead the average judge to fail to apply the proper" rules in a trial. Fero v.
Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1480 (10th Cir. 1994). In In re Billedeaux, 972 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1992), the
court believed that the interest of the judge's relative was too remote and speculative for the
appearance of partiality standard to require recusal. See id. at 106. The decision prompted a stinging
dissent about how a reasonable person would respond:
[I]f the average person is asked whether he would feel comfortable having his own
personal injury case tried by a judge whose spouse was a partner in a law firm that
represented the defendant in other matters, the answer would be, "Would the judge really
be impartial?" I think that question is reasonable.
Id. at 107 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
When the lawyer-relative represents similarly named but different parties than those in the
instant case, it has been held that a reasonable person knowing all the facts likely would find no
conflict. See, e.g., Six West Retail Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., 2003 WL 282187
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that "Sony defendants in this case and the Sony entities represented by [the
judge's] husband's firm are not the same parties . . . [but] merely two of many separate, although
related, corporations bearing the Sony name"); Canino v. Barclays Bank, PLC, 1998 WL 7219, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that spouse's law firm had been retained by Barclays on an unrelated
case does not require recusal).
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partners in law firms appearing before the Court. 58 The pertinent
portions state:
We have spouses, children or other relatives within the degree of
relationship covered by 28 U.S.C. § 455 who are or may become
practicing attorneys .... We think it desirable to set forth what our
recusal policy will be... when the covered lawyer is a partner in a
firm appearing before us ....
The provision of the recusal statute that deals specifically with a
relative's involvement as a lawyer in the case requires recusal only
when the covered relative "[i]s acting as a lawyer in the proceeding."
§ 455(b)(5)(ii). It is well established that this provision requires
personal participation in the representation, and not just membership in
the representing firm, see, e.g., Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co.,
609 F.2d 1101, 1113 (CA5), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980). It is
also apparent, from use of the present tense, that current participation
as lawyer, and not merely past involvement in earlier stages of the
litigation, is required.
A relative's partnership status, or participation in earlier stages of
the litigation, is relevant, therefore, only under one of two less specific
provisions of § 455, which require recusal when the judge knows that
the relative has "an interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding," § 455(b)(5)(iii), or when for any reason
the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned," § 455(a).
We think that a relative's partnership in the firm appearing before us,
or his or her previous work as a lawyer on a case that later comes
before us, does not automatically trigger these provisions. If that were
the intent of the law, the per se "lawyer-related recusal" requirement of
§ 455(b)(5)(ii) would have expressed it. Per se recusal for a relative's
membership in the partnership appearing here, or for a relative's work
on the case below, would render the limitation of § 455(b)(5)(iii) [sic]
to personalwork, and to present representation, meaningless.
We do not think it would serve the public interest to go beyond the
requirements of the statute, and to recuse ourselves, out of an excess of
caution, whenever a relative is a partner in the firm before us or acted
as a lawyer at an earlier stage. Even one unnecessary recusal impairs
the functioning of the Court. Given the size and number of today's
58. Statement of Recusal Policy, Supreme Court of the United States (Nov. 1, 1993) (on file
with Hofstra Law Review). Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Ginsburg signed the Statement. See id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/7

14

Abramson: The Judge's Relative is Affiliated with Counsel of Record: The Et

20041

THE JUDGE'SRELATIVE

1195

national law firms, and the frequent appearance before us of many of
them in a single case, recusal might become a common occurrence,
and opportunities would be multiplied for "strategizing" recusals, that
is, selecting law firms with an eye to producing the recusal of
particular Justices. In this Court, where the absence of one Justice
cannot be made up by another, needless recusal deprives litigants of
the nine Justices to which they are entitled, produces the possibility of
an even division on the merits of the case, and has a distorting effect
upon the certiorari process, requiring the petitioner to obtain (under our
current practice) four votes out of eight instead of four out of nine.

[We will recuse ourselves where] the amount of the relative's
compensation could be substantially affected by the outcome here.
That would require our recusal even if the relative had not worked on
the case, but was merely a partner in the firm that shared the profits. It
seems to us that in virtually every case before us with retained counsel
there exists a genuine possibility that... the outcome will have a
substantial effect upon each partner's compensation. Since it is
impractical to assure ourselves of the absence of such consequences in
each individual case, we shall recuse ourselves from all cases in which
appearances on behalf of parties are made by firms in which our
relatives are partners, unless we have received from the firm written
assurance that income from Supreme Court litigation is, 59on a
permanent basis, excluded from our relatives' partnership shares.
The statement covers past, active involvement of the lawyerrelative in the instant proceeding, 60 as well as the lawyer-relative
situation. For the lawyer-partner, the Statement observes that the federal
statutes may suggest recusal under the "two less specific provisions of
§ 455"-"'an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding"' and the appearance of partiality-but it notes that a
lawyer-relative's partnership in a firm appearing before it, or the
relative's earlier work on a case later coming before the Court do "not
automatically trigger these provisions."

59. Id.
60. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, past involvement of the lawyer-relative
can create an appearance of partiality when the judge later presides in the case. For example, the
relative's fee arrangement may be dependent upon the ultimate outcome of the case, which the
judge's decisions may influence. Moreover, a bright-line rule negating recusal for past involvement
could result in lawyer-relatives remaining as counsel until the case finds its way to the judgerelative's court.
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The final text of the "Statement of Recusal Policy" suggests a series
of drafts and compromises which led to a rather disjointed result. The
Justices initially stated that it does not serve the public interest to recuse
"out of an excess of caution, whenever a relative is a partner in the firm
before us." They noted that unnecessary recusals would harm the
Court's functioning. "Needless recusal[s]" affect the certiorari process
and may produce an even division on the merits of the case. In addition,
they would produce opportunities for the "comAnon occurrence" of
recusal especially as a preferred matter of strategy. 61 The Statement
assumes that the relatives will be in "national law firms" that frequently
appear before the Court. At this point in the Statement, recital of these
legitimate arguments suggests to the reader that the Justices will
presume that recusal is not essential and instead look at the possibility of
recusal on a case-by-case basis.
In a stunning turnabout from the declarations in the earlier part of
the Statement, the Justices then stated that recusal will occur in "all
cases in which appearances on behalf of parties are made by firms in
which our relatives are partners." They recognized "that in virtually
every case before us with retained counsel there exists a genuine
possibility that the outcome will have a substantial effect upon each
partner's compensation." Their statement appears to exclude those cases
where the lawyer-relative's large firm is representing a party pro bono or
as the result of a court appointment.
The Statement also seems conclusively to eliminate any
nonpecuniary interest in reputation or goodwill as relevant to the
Justices' recusal decision. "The policy takes no account of the prestige
benefit of winning a case in the Supreme Court---especially a
controversial case."62 The primary benefit to a law firm of taking and
winning a case in the Court may well be to the enhanced reputation of
the law firm and its partners instead of a financial interest. And
complying with the Statement by not providing a portion of the fees
derived from a case in the Court to the lawyer-relative does not prevent

61. If a court finds that the sole or primary reason for retaining the judge's relative is to
disqualify the judge, the lawyer is disqualified. See, e.g., In re BellSouth, 334 F.3d 941, 949 (1 lth
Cir. 2003).
62. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do AppearancesMatter? JudicialImpartiality and the Supreme Court
in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REv. 606, 630 (2002) (discussing the written assurances sent to the
Court by his law firm that Eugene Scalia would receive no pecuniary benefit from his firm's
representation of George W. Bush in the Supreme Court litigation).
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him or her from receiving a reputational benefit attaching to all
partners.63
For the signatories to the Statement, the only exception to the
bright-line recusal in the Statement occurs when the Court has "received
from the firm written assurance that income from Supreme Court
litigation is, on a permanent basis, excluded from our relatives'
partnership shares." Imprecision in this exclusion leaves open such
issues as when the written assurance needs to be received. 64 Common
sense indicates that the law firm would forward the written assurance no
later than the time when a response to a petition for certiorari is due.
Second, does "permanent basis" for the relative's exclusion from
the partnership share refer only to the case at bar? It is possible to read
the "permanent basis" language so that law firms with relatives of
Supreme Court Justices will effectively "register" their financial
arrangement with the relative-partner so that it is effective for any case
thereafter in which the firm is appearing. Otherwise, it could be argued
that the Statement's reference to "permanent basis" could be construed
to be a case-by-case financial agreement perhaps excluding the lawyerrelative from compensation as long as each case is pending before the
Court.
Finally, why did the Justices not acknowledge the possibility that
the parties can waive the disqualification? As already mentioned, the
federal statute permits a waiver of judicial recusal for an appearance of
partiality but not for an "interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome" of the case. Failing to consider waiver as an alternative
may leave the Court with the "possibility of an even division on the
merits of the case, and.., a distorting effect upon the certiorari process"
that the Statement itself seeks to avoid.
B. Lawyer-Relative as a Non-Partner
Case law generally shows a judicial reluctance to disqualify when
the judge's lawyer-relative is merely affiliated with a law firm but is not
a partner. 65 The analysis generally focuses on whether the relative's
63., See id.
64. Apparently, Supreme Court litigation profits had been deducted from Eugene Scalia's
partnership income for at least two years before his firm's involvement in Bush v. Gore. See
Neumann, supra note 44, at 443.
65. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 140 F.3d 1161, at 1162-63 (8th Cir. 1998)
(child had accepted but not begun position as associate); United States ex rel. Weinberger v.
Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 463-64 (5th Cir. 1977) (child was associate); Wilmington Towing Co.
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association with the law firm raises the issue of whether the judge's
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned., 66 One of the earlier cases
that addressed the issue was United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax,
Inc. ,67 in which the trial judge refused to recuse after discovering that his
son was an associate in the law firm representing one of the parties.6 8
Conceding that the issue might be resolved differently if the judge's son
were a partner in the law firm, the court found that automatic
disqualification was inappropriate because the son's salary interest as an
associate was "too remote" to constitute a "financial interest" under the
federal statutory scheme.6 9
After assuming that the relative-judge had examined the lawyers'
arguments, the Equifax court also concluded that the judge had not
abused his discretion by denying the motion to recuse under the general
appearance of partiality standard.7 ° While the court recognized that the
judicial viewpoint for deciding the appearance of partiality issue is that
of the reasonable person, the court noted that the trial judge had
"perceived no justification for removing himself," perhaps implying that
71
the analysis was exclusively from the judge's subjective perspective.
As mentioned, most appellate decisions rely on the appearance of
partiality standard, 72 because it is generally assumed that a non-partner
lawyer-relative is salaried. As the Commentary and the decisions state
v. Cape Fear Towing Co., 624 F. Supp. 1210, 1211 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (child was temporary summer
employee and tentatively accepted offer of employment as associate); Miller Indus., Inc. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F. Supp 84, 85 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (father was "of counsel" to firm);
Washington v. Mont. Mining Props., Inc., 795 P.2d 460, 462 (Mont. 1990) (son was intern); Keene
Corp. v. Rogers, 863 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (son-in-law was associate); Stephens v.
Stephens, 292 S.E.2d 689, 690 (Ga. 1982) (child was associate). Cf In re Kan. Pub. Employees Ret.
Sys., 85 F.3d 1353, 1357 (8th Cir. 1996) (child accepted but later withdrew acceptance of
employment offer to be an associate with party-law firm).
66. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Weinberger, 557 F.2d at 463-64 (son was an associate);
Cloverdale Equip. Co. v. Manitowoc Eng'g Co., 964 F. Supp. 1152, 1155 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (son
was a junior associate); Wilmington Towing Co., 624 F. Supp. at 1211-1212 (child was summer
intern and tentatively accepted offer of employment as associate after graduation from law school).
67. 557 F.2d 456 (5thCir. 1977).
68. See id. at 463-64.
69. See id.
at 463; see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iii) (2000).
70. See United States ex rel. Weinberger, 557 F.2d at 464.
71. See id.
72. Decisions applying the "interest" standard usually conclude that there is no need for
disqualification, finding no effect, much less a substantial effect, created when the salaried-lawyerrelative's firm is counsel of record. The salaried attorney's position with the firm affords no
discernible interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the case. See, e.g., Jenkins
v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 140 F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (8th Cir. 1998); Miller Indus., Inc. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F. Supp 84, 85-86 (S.D. Ala. 1980)
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without explanation, the affiliation with the law firm by itself provides
no reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality, even when
the relationship with the judge is a first-degree connection.73 On the
other hand, a concern for the harm caused to public confidence in the
judicial system creates an arguable appearance of partiality even when a
nonpartner-relative's firm appears before the judge.74 The reasonable
person may conclude that, "No wonder that party won. The judge's
relative works for their law firm!"
C. Lawyer-Relative as PublicAttorney
Judicial decisions are split about whether recusal is necessary when
a relative is a government attorney but is not counsel of record in the
pending case. A government lawyer's "compensation and clientele are
set, and the prestige of the office as a whole is not greatly affected by the
outcome of a particular case., 75 Thus, a prosecutor usually has no
interest that would be affected by a prosecution brought by another
prosecuting attorney in the same office, and the fact that a judge is
disqualified when a lawyer-relative is counsel of record is not imputed to
the lawyer-relative's fellow prosecutors.
In State v. Logan,76 the judge's son worked as an assistant
prosecutor whose colleague was trying to convict the appellant.77 The
appellate court upheld the trial judge's denial of the motion to disqualify
for two reasons. First, unlike a private law firm, a prosecutor lacks an
interest in developing the goodwill that attracts clients.78 Building a
reputation, moreover, is inadequate to create an appearance of
partiality.79 Second, no reasonable person would believe that a judge80 is
likely to be pro-prosecution merely because a relative is a prosecutor.

73. See, e.g., Wilmington Towing Co. v. Cape Fear Towing Co. 624 F. Supp. 1210, 1212
(E.D.N.C. 1986); Keene Corp. v. Rogers, 863 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); see also
Washington v. Mont. Mining Props., Inc., 795 P.2d 460, 464 (Mont. 1990) (although the judge's
son's internship with counsel of record did not create the appearance of impropriety, recusal was
required in light of other circumstances that were considered).
74. See, e.g., Stephens v. Stephens, 292 S.E.2d 689, 692 (Ga. 1982).
75. Smith v. Beckman, 683 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
76. 689 P.2d 778 (Kan. 1984).
77. See id. at 780.
78. See id.
at 784-85.
79. See id.at 785.
80. See id; see also State v. Harrell, 546 N.W.2d 115, 116 (Wis. 1996) (finding no duty for
judge to disqualify when spouse works in prosecutor's office, when spouse did not participate in or
help prepare instant case); Trimble v. State, 871 S.W.2d 562, 567 (Ark. 1994) (determining that
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By contrast, the court in Smith v. Beckman8 1 prohibited a judge
from presiding in a case because the judge's spouse worked in the
prosecutor's office, even though steps had been taken to ensure that the
spouse had no contact with cases in which the judge presided.82 As in the
private law firm context, the Smith decision leaves the relatives with a
choice. Either the relative can forego certain types of law practice, or the
judge's docket can be adjusted significantly to eliminate cases involving
the lawyer-relative's public agency. The latter adjustment may be
feasible in a multi-judge district. However, in a single-judge area, the
logistics of special judge appointments may result in unwanted delays
for attorneys and litigants.

III. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Public confidence in the judiciary can be restored by modifying the
interpretation and application of ethical norms. Judges may not recuse
themselves as frequently as may be necessary to preserve public
confidence in the judiciary. The black-letter language of the ABA Code
and the federal statute should be modified so that a judge is disqualified:
When the judge knows that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a
law firn in which a relative of the judge is a partner or has an
ownership interest in the law firm.
The new standard clarifies that recusal is mandatory when the
lawyer-relative is a partner, regardless of how the relative's partnership
interest in the firm is defined. Recusal is necessary whether the lawyerrelative is an equity or salaried partner. The status of the lawyer-relative
as a partner, rather than the method of remuneration, determines whether
recusal is compulsory. From the perspective of the reasonable person, a
lawyer-relative's partnership position in a law firm creates the
appearance of partiality, or an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the case, or both. Withholding litigation
profits from the lawyer-relatives is not an alternative to recusal, because
removing the financial interest still leaves a reputational or goodwill

although the appearance generated by employing the judge's son for the summer in the prosecutor's
office was "none too good," no disqualification was required).
The Logan concurrence found it "preferable ... for a trial judge to recuse himself from
the trial of criminal cases or. . . to offer to do so on the record." Logan, 689 P.2d at 785 (Miller, J.,
concurring).
81. 683 P.2d 1214 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
82, See id. at 1216.
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interest for the lawyer-relative. Nevertheless, the parties and attorneys
could still use the remittal provisions to waive the conflict.
For non-partner, lawyer-relatives who are affiliated with a law firm
or government agency, the Commentary to the Codes should be
amended to emphasize the importance of a careful factual analysis under
the appearance of partiality standard.
Under appropriate circumstances, when the judge knows that the
relative is affiliated with a law firm of record in a proceeding
disqualification may also be required, because "the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." The relevant factors for making a
decision about recusal include consideration of (1) the size of the
lawyer-relative's law firm, the nature and notoriety of the proceeding,
(2) the fee arrangement between the law firm and the client,
(3) whether the lawyer-relative is working for a private law firm or a
public agency, (4) whether the lawyer-relative's reputation or goodwill
will be significantly enhanced by a successful result in the proceeding,
(5) the nature and degree of the relationship between the judge and the
lawyer-relative, (6) the prospect of an imminent decision regarding
promotion or retention for the lawyer-relative, and (7) whether the law
firm's compensation plan includes a bonus or other reward system.
While it is possible that these factors often will result in judicial
disqualification, a per se rule is inappropriate for all the various
combinations of factors under the Commentary. As a Commentary
should, the language informs judges, lawyer-relatives, and other lawyers
and parties about the relevant standards which a judge should weigh
when faced with a motion to disqualify or a decision to recuse sua
sponte. The list is not exhaustive, but it reflects important circumstances
in the current case law. As more legal decisions are reported, other
factors can be added.
CONCLUSION

The ABA Model Codes of Judicial Conduct and federal statutes
describe the ethical duty of a judge to recuse himself or herself from a
case when the judge's lawyer-relative is affiliated with counsel of
record. This Article has noted specific ways in which trial and appellate
courts have interpreted or applied the ethics standards. The common law
of judicial disqualification which has developed attests to the difficulty
in drafting ethical standards which address every specific situation that
might arise. Periodic modification of the standards is important to reflect
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legal developments as well as current levels of public confidence in the
judiciary.
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